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n January 22nd, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) gave its long-
awaited opinion in the case concerning the European Securities and Markets 
Authority (ESMA).1 The ruling is important in order to appreciate the modern 
understanding of the Meroni non-delegation doctrine. It is not the purpose of this CEPS 
Commentary to provide a fully-fledged analysis of the ESMA ruling,2 but rather to extract 
the potential implications of the ESMA case for the place and significance of the Meroni 
doctrine in building up the single market. We aim to demonstrate that the ESMA case is yet 
another manifestation of a slow process of “mellowing Meroni’. This is a critical condition 
for a new single market strategy aiming to end the remaining fragmentation of the single 
market – not only in financial markets but also in network industries – and ensure its ‘proper 
functioning’. 
Debating Meroni: The ESMA case 
As a derivative of the 1956 Meroni case still under the European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC),3 the non-delegation doctrine has only become a source of technical/legal debate 
since about the mid-1990s, and especially after lawyers began to take a more critical view of 
the interpretation under the Maastricht, Nice and Lisbon Treaties.4 A short summary of the 
                                                   
1 See Case C-270/12, United Kingdom v Parliament and Council 
(http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document_print.jsf?doclang=EN&text=&pageIndex=0&par
t=1&mode=lst&docid=146621&occ=first&dir=&cid=82023).  
2 For a more comprehensive treatment, see Jacques Pelkmans and Marta Simoncini, “Putting Meroni 
to rest: Towards a single market for network industries”, paper presented at the European University 
Institute, Florence, September 2013 (under revision for forthcoming publication). 
3 Cases 9/56 and 10/56, Meroni & Co, Industrie Metallurgiche v. High Authority, [1957-1958] ECR 133. 
4 See A. Kreher, “Agencies in the European Community – a step towards administrative integration in 
Europe”, Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 4, No. 2, 1997, pp. 225-245; R. Dehousse, “Misfits: EU 
Law and the Transformation of European Governance”, Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 2; European 
University Institute, Florence, 2002; D. Gerardin, R. Muñoz and N. Petit (eds), Regulation through 
Agencies in the EU. A New Paradigm of European Governance, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2005; E. Chiti, 
“An important part of the EU’s institutional machinery: Features, problems and perspectives of 
O 
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Meroni doctrine, developed somewhat since the original 1956 case, includes the following 
essentials. The EU Member States have delegated powers to the EU level and one cannot 
presume that any such powers can, in turn, be delegated to (say) an EU agency without an 
explicit decision, although an explicit Treaty base is not indispensable. If powers are 
delegated, they cannot be ‘discretionary’ to such an extent that the ‘wide margin of 
discretion’ might enable the ‘execution of actual economic policy’. The latter would mean an 
illegal transfer of responsibility (it is the delegator, not the delegate, making the policy 
choices) and would alter the balance of powers, later interpreted as the ‘institutional balance’ 
between the EU institutions. Any delegated powers should be embedded in or accompanied 
by guarantees of judicial review, transparency and active consultation. To that end, it is also 
required to delegate powers under precise rules and within boundaries carefully defined by 
the EU legislator.  
The UK was seeking an annulment of Art. 28 of the ESMA regulation,5 which empowers 
ESMA to forbid short-selling in certain highly specific circumstances and under strict 
conditions. This competence is part of ESMA’s duty to exercise proper supervision and to 
prevent activities that “threaten the orderly functioning and integrity of financial markets or 
the stability of the whole or part of the financial system in the Union” and, “if so required in 
the case of an emergency situation” (Art. 9(5) ESMA Regulation). The UK invoked the non-
delegation doctrine that generally goes under the label of the ‘Meroni doctrine’ and the legal 
limits to harmonisation in the internal market as the grounds for seeking annulment of Art. 
28. The UK employed four arguments in advocating annulment, all four of which the CJEU 
dismissed in their entirety. 
First of all, the UK contended that in the exercise of supervisory powers on short-selling 
market, ESMA had been given broad discretionary tasks that may have a political nature, 
which would be at odds with the Meroni principle on the delegation of powers. Secondly, 
the UK deemed such tasks contrary to the principle set in the Romano case (C-98/80)6 
concerning the prohibition on administrative bodies to adopt measures of general 
application with the force of law. 
Following the Opinion of Advocate General Niilo Jääskinen, the CJEU recognised the 
lawfulness of the delegation of powers to ESMA as long as objective criteria and 
circumscribed conditions led the exercise of the delegated powers and these criteria and 
conditions are amenable to judicial review. According to the AG and the CJEU, the Lisbon 
Treaty has introduced critical guarantees that allow EU agencies to be lawfully delegated 
regulatory powers (such as Arts 263 and. 277 TFEU on judicial review). 
Nowadays, therefore, the Meroni doctrine has been updated to the changed ‘constitutional’ 
framework of the treaties. If delegation complies with the legal guarantees set by the current 
context of the treaties, no dangerous (and unlawful) shift of responsibility would occur. 
                                                                                                                                                               
European agencies”, Common Market Law Review, Vol. 46, 2009; S. Griller and A. Orator, “Everything 
under control? The ‘way forward’ for European agencies in the footsteps of the Meroni doctrine”, 
European Law Review, Vol. 35, No. 3, 2010; D. Sorace, “Una nuova base costituzionale europea per la 
pubblica amministrazione”, in M.P. Chiti and A. Natalini (eds), Lo spazio amministrativo europeo. Le 
pubbliche amministrazioni dopo il Trattato di Lisbona, Bologna: Il Mulino, 2012; M. Chamon, “EU agencies 
between Meroni and Romano or the devil and the deep blue sea”, Common Market Law Review, Vol 48, 
2011. 
5 Reg. 236/2012 of 14 March 2012, OJEU 2012 L 86/1. 
6 See http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:61980CJ0098:EN:HTML 
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The third plea in law of the UK concerned the infringement of Arts 290 and 291 TFEU. In the 
opinion of the UK, the Council could only confer to the European Commission the powers to 
adopt non-legislative acts of general application as well as implementing acts. 
According to the Opinion of the AG, EU agencies cannot adopt the delegated acts under Art. 
290 TFEU, since these are able to change the normative content of legislative acts. However, 
if the criteria of delegation set out in Meroni are complied with, EU agencies may be 
endowed with the implementing powers under Art. 291 TFEU as a “midway solution 
between vesting implementing authority in either the Commission or the Council, on the one 
hand, or leaving it the Member States, on the other” (para. 86, Opinion). 
The judgment of the CJEU dismisses the plea in question, by saying that the powers 
conferred to ESMA do not correspond to the circumstances set in Arts 290 and 291 TFEU. 
ESMA’s powers in the short-selling market should be read in context with “a series of rules 
designed to endow the competent national authorities and ESMA with powers of 
intervention to cope with adverse developments which threaten financial stability within the 
Union and market confidence” (para. 85, of the judgment). Within the limits of the ‘updated’ 
Meroni doctrine, when pursuing specific policy objectives, the Council may delegate 
regulatory powers to EU bodies with specific technical expertise. The Court, therefore, seems 
to distinguish the (Meroni-compatible) delegation of powers to EU agencies that is only 
indirectly recognised in the Treaties, from the explicit delegation of powers to the European 
Commission under Arts 290 and 291 TFEU. 
In its fourth plea in law, the UK alleged the infringement of Art. 114 TFEU on the 
harmonisation in the internal market, because its use as a legal basis for ESMA powers was 
ultra vires. The UK argued that this provision is not intended to authorise ESMA to take 
individual measures directed at natural and legal persons. 
Relying on this plea, the AG asked the CJEU for the annulment of the provision in question, 
since ESMA’s special powers go beyond internal market harmonisation. 
In principle and on the ground of previous case law (in particular, C-66/04, UK v. Parliament 
and Council, and C-217/04, UK v. Parliament and Council), the AG recognised that 
harmonisation measures are not to be considered to be directed only to Member States. 
Methods of harmonisation should be left to the discretion of the legislature, with the aim of 
identifying the most suitable measures, especially in complex technical domains. However, 
he argued that the specific hard-law, regulatory powers conferred to ESMA aimed at 
“intervening on the conditions of competition” (para. 45, Opinion) and as such were not 
covered by the treaties. To make ESMA able to legitimately exercise those powers, therefore, 
the AG suggested that the appropriate legal basis would be identified in Art. 352 TFEU, 
which usually applies when no explicit conferred power are provided in the Treaties, but 
nonetheless the concerned powers are necessary to achieve the goals of the Treaties.7 
Since Art. 352 TFEU requires the unanimity of the Member States to introduce the necessary 
measures, the choice of this provision as the appropriate legal basis for the exercise of 
ESMA’s powers would have confirmed the status quo about the future integration in the 
internal market, here, financial markets and the stability of the financial system. The faithful 
follow-up of the outcome of the subsidiarity test with respect to the proper functioning of the 
internal financial market would still have been at the mercy of purely political interests of 
Member States, rather than those of the Union. If the outcome of a functional subsidiarity 
test, based on the harsh experience of the recent financial crisis providing compelling 
                                                   
7 Note that this article was solely referring to the internal (or common) market until Lisbon (e.g. Art. 
308, EC). 
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empirical evidence, can be stopped by one Member State, a properly functioning single 
market cannot be pursued in earnest, with possibly dire consequences once again. That the 
CJEU established a clear link with the core idea of a functional subsidiarity test (i.e. 
[negative] intra-EU cross-border externalities) is clear from the following quote: “... ESMA 
can adopt measures under Art. 28(1) of Regulation no. 236/2012 only if, as provided in Art. 
28(2), such measures address a threat to the orderly functioning and integrity of financial 
markets or to the stability of the whole or part of the financial system of the Union and there 
are cross-border implications. Moreover, all ESMA measures are subject to the condition that 
either no competent authority has taken measures to address the threat or one or more of 
those authorities have taken measures which have proven not to address the threat 
adequately.“ [para. 46, judgment] 
The CJEU, however, did not support the AG on this ground. Like the AG, the Court 
recognised that harmonisation measures need not to be directed exclusively to Member 
States. What is more, the CJEU held that Art. 28 of the contested regulation aimed to improve 
the conditions for the establishment and functioning of the internal market in the financial 
field and that the conferral of powers to an EU agency was a legitimate method for pursuing 
such harmonisation. After first paraphrasing para. 46 again of the ruling [quoted above] the 
CJEU concluded: “It follows that the purpose of the powers provided for in Article 28 of Art. 
28 of Regulation no. 236/2012 is in fact to improve the conditions for the establishment and 
functioning of the internal market in the financial field” [para. 116, judgment]. 
The not-so-single market for network industries and Meroni  
In some (services) markets and for network infrastructures with high sunk costs, such as for 
energy, eCommunications and (freight) railways, the establishment and proper functioning 
of the single market can simply not be accomplished without selective and proportionate 
centralisation of some strategic tasks of rule-making and enforcement, partly indeed within 
EU Agencies. This is not a matter of expressing political preferences for ‘more Europe’ (or 
not), but a question of a rigorous, functional application of the subsidiarity test. In other 
words, if one truly pursues an integrated single market in these policy domains as well as its 
proper functioning, one ought to conduct a functional subsidiarity test aimed at identifying 
the level of government that can address the concerned task more effectively. The EU ought 
to act according to the outcome of the test by enacting the appropriate regulatory and/or 
institutional measures. 
For all the enormous progress the single market has made over the last few decades8 in the 
very domains where a higher degree of centralisation via quasi-independent EU Agencies is 
required, the resistance is strong. There are essentially two reasons why the selective, yet 
indispensable centralisation is not coming about or only excruciatingly slow (and hence, is 
not yet effective): one boils down to vested interests of national governments or their 
agencies/regulators/supervisors (where relevant) and/or business segments benefitting 
from the fragmentation; the other one is the excuse of the Meroni doctrine. Even when the 
first type of resistance has become less credible or is shown to be costly for the EU or is 
gradually objected to by European business in light of European strategies or globalisation, 
the Meroni ‘excuse’ has been chilling or killing almost any debate about the functional need 
of EU Agencies. Ever since the mid-1990s, the Meroni doctrine has stalled all attempts to 
endow, when explicitly and carefully justified, EU Agencies with powers ensuring the 
proper functioning of a truly single market. The doctrine has become a convenient political 
                                                   
8 See Jacques Pelkmans, “Single market: Deepening and widening over time”, Intereconomics, Vol. 46, 
No. 2, March/April 2011. 
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axiom amongst the EU Member States and their governments or agencies: executive 
functions, largely vested in the Commission, cannot be delegated to EU bodies. 
The non-delegation doctrine undoubtedly has constitutional virtues and the present authors 
wish to emphasise those once again. Member States expect, rightly so, that the principle of 
conferral of powers to the EU level is not undermined. Subsequently, they expect that at the 
EU level a careful institutional balance is maintained between the three principal EU 
decision-making institutions (namely, the Council of Ministers, the European Parliament and 
the European Commission), in such a way that the essential (call them “political”) policy and 
regulatory objectives and strategies are determined and controlled by them (and nowadays, 
also the EP). In this general political sense, there is nothing wrong with Meroni. For the EU 
to be and remain a sound and legitimate Union, it is crucial that the non-delegation doctrine 
protects the Member States against structural shifts in essential political powers that they 
have not explicitly agreed to. 
The problem with Meroni is not constitutional, but operational. Using Meroni as an axiom, 
simply because it is most convenient for national regulators/supervisors (and selectively 
supported by business), has proven dysfunctional for the Union and prevented the single 
market from coming into being in a number of sub-markets 9 What matters for the treaty 
objectives, however, is that one cardinal principle – the constitutional non-delegation 
principle – is upheld, whilst another existential duty of the Union – the establishment and 
proper functioning of the single market – is vigorously pursued as well. Thus, rather than 
‘manipulating’ Meroni as a freezing axiom, without serious debate and being careless about 
the resulting fragmentation, it is the duty of Member States and, indeed, of all three EU 
decision-making bodies to find a balance between these two critical drivers of the Union. 
Implications of ESMA for a better functioning single market 
The ESMA ruling is yet another step in a very gradual process of the EU coming to terms 
with the appropriate and justified degree of delegation to EU agencies (with some carefully 
circumscribed regulatory or intervention powers) for the completion and proper functioning 
of the single market. This applies to financial markets and to network industries, mostly with 
large sunk costs. One can observe a highly cautious beginning in e.g. the functioning of 
EASA (for technical inspections and certification of aircraft), the proposed expansion of ERA 
(for rail) powers to EU-wide licensing of rolling stock, the consecutive shifts of supervisory 
powers via a new banking supervisory agency (EBA) to the ECB (a genuine and fully 
independent EU agency under the treaty) and this time with (bank) resolution powers, and 
the political battles about the gas/electricity agency (ACER) and the one for 
eCommunications (BEREC, in fact, more like a common subsidiary of the national agencies). 
The ESMA ruling shows clearly that, with the important proviso of convincing conditions 
and appropriate guarantees of legitimacy, transparency and judicial review, the single 
market could benefit from EU agencies fulfilling similar functions in such sub-markets as 
(quasi-independent) technical agencies all over the world – and indeed in national markets 
                                                   
9 How deeply fragmented the internal market for network industries (with infrastructures with large 
sunk costs) still is after some 25 years of EU liberalisation and EU regulation, is perhaps too little 
realised. A wake-up call is provided in Jacques Pelkmans and Andrea Renda, “Single eComms 
market? …no such thing”, Communications & Strategy, No. 82, Spring, 2011. The deep fragmentation is 
confirmed for eComms, freight rail and gas/electricity in European Commission, “Market functioning 
in Network Industries”, DG EcFin European Economy Occasional Paper No. 129, February 2013. 
Many other sources are referred to in Pelkmans & Simoncini, op. cit. 
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in the EU – routinely do – namely by ensuring that such markets function properly by 
detailing the regulatory regimes and intervening, if necessary, immediately to prevent harm. 
What would be most undesirable is to toss away the Meroni doctrine. Rather, what is 
urgently needed is to ‘mellow’ the application of the doctrine, but only in those instances 
where a compelling case has been made for the sake of the establishment and proper 
functioning of the single market, the core economic function of the Union. 
In light of the Lisbon institutional framework as set in the Treaties and the CJEU case law, 
the ESMA judgment of the CJEU seems to confirm the acceptability of a ‘mellow’ 
interpretation. In fact, ‘mellowing Meroni’ is not about rejecting the constitutional principle 
of legitimate delegation itself, but it is rather about finding a balance between this 
fundamental principle and the principle of establishing and ensuring the functioning of the 
internal market surrounded by legal conditions and guarantees. Exactly as the CJEU has 
confirmed in the ESMA case, Meroni is not there to freeze half-baked integration, if not 
sometimes fragmentation, of the internal market. 
